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This research sheds insight on the psychological impact of mixed emotions on 
attitudes. In three experiments, we show that persuasion appeals that highlight 
conflicting emotions (e.g., both happiness and sadness) lead to less favorable 
attitudes for individuals with a lower propensity to accept duality (e.g., Anglo 
Americans, younger adults) relative to those with a higher propensity (e.g., Asian 
Americans, older adults). Experiment 1 demonstrates that this effect appears to be 
due to increased levels of felt discomfort that arise for those with a lower, but not 
higher, propensity to accept duality when exposed to mixed emotional appeals 
Experiments 2 and 3 replicate this result across product categories and distinct 
operationalizations of duality acceptance, and show that results are not due to 
differences in the recognition of depicted emotions. Theoretical implications 
regarding boundary conditions of emotional dissonance and distinctions between 




Consider a recent appeal for the insurance company, 
New York Life (actual ad, circa 2001). The television 
advertisement focuses on a widow and her children grieving 
over the loss of their beloved husband and father, yet at the 
same time expressing gratitude for the sense of comfort and 
security that his life insurance policy is able to provide for 
them. Similarly, embedded in a recent issue in a Rolling 
Stones magazine is a two-page print advertisement filled with 
white space and the single sentence, “She can make me laugh 
even when I'm mad at her,” closing with “That Certain 
Something, Diet Coke.”   
The above examples illustrate the use of mixed emotions 
in persuasive appeals. While considerable research in 
consumer behavior has focused on the influence of pure 
emotions in persuasion (e.g., Aaker and Williams 1998; Burke 
and Edell 1986; Edell and Burke 1987; Holbrook and Batra 
1987), less work has been done on the topic of experiencing 
mixed emotions and the consequences of doing so. A 
growing interest in the emotional nature of persuasion 
processes, and the role of conflicting psychological states in 
particular, make this gap in the consumer behavior literature 
even more significant (c.f., Bagozzi, Wong and Yi 1999; Mick 
and Fournier 1998).  
In contrast, psychologists have been very interested in 
the topic of mixed emotions, emphatically debating the 
degree to which conflicting emotions can be simultaneously 
experienced. One perspective suggests that the ability to 
experience conflicting emotions simultaneously is limited, as 
positive and negative emotions represent opposite 
dimensions on a bipolar scale (Green, Goldman and Salovey 
1993). A second perspective argues the opposite, namely that 
emotional valence is represented by two independent 
dimensions. Thus, not only can one simultaneously 
experience conflicting emotions, such joint experience may 
be natural and frequently occurring (Cacioppo, Gardner and 
Berntson 1997; Larsen, McGraw and Cacioppo in press).  
Despite the increasing interest in mixed emotions in 
psychology, there has been little effort to examine the impact 
of mixed emotional experiences in the context of consumer 
behavior, or the impact such experience might have on 
persuasion outcomes such as attitudes toward a persuasive 
appeal. While the debate continues about the degree to which 
positive and negative emotions have a bipolar versus 
independent relationship, advertisers are using mixed 
emotions in appeals, as illustrated above. We bring together 
previous work on the experience of duality in consumer 
behavior with an examination of the simultaneous experience 
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of conflicting emotions in order to explore how mixed 
emotions are experienced, what impact such experience 
might have on persuasion outcomes, and why these 
outcomes may arise.  
  
DUALITY AND THE PROPENSITY TO 
ACCEPT IT 
 
The acceptance of duality, which refers to the ongoing 
process of accepting and synthesizing contradiction in 
elements or forms (Basseches 1980), has been a focus of 
research in philosophy, religious studies, anthropology and 
psychology. Consumer researchers have identified a number 
of circumstances under which individuals experience duality 
in consumption settings and have discussed how consumers 
try to reconcile such experiences. For example, Mick and 
Fournier (1998) examine conflicting psychological states due 
to the paradoxical meanings and influences that technology 
portends in daily life.   
Much of the work on paradox or duality has focused on 
the negative consequences associated with such experience 
(e.g., anxiety and stress; Freud 1938). Hegel, for example, 
argued that alienation, or the cutting off from reality, occurs 
when thoughts are in conflict and cannot be resolved. In the 
domain of consumer behavior, Rook (1985) finds that 
impulsive buying behavior raises a conflict between pleasure 
and reality principles (e.g., income limitations), which 
becomes a source of emotional conflict for the consumer.  
However, some research suggests that contradictory 
elements do not always lead to negative outcomes. For 
example, Scott (1994) argues that some advertisements 
containing dialectical elements (e.g., a Honda ad conveying 
both the negative emotions felt when experiencing cramped 
space as well as the positive emotions associated with 
experiencing openness) may not lead to negative outcomes, 
but instead may give rise to a third independent emotion 
(e.g., amusement based on the cleverness of the ad), 
potentially leading to positive evaluations. 
Under what circumstances might the experience of 
duality lead to negative outcomes? The current research 
posits that the degree to which negative consequences fall 
from exposure to duality or mixedness is influenced by the 
extent to which individuals can process and accept duality, a 
moderating variable that may vary both across situations and 
across individuals. Proclivity to accept duality has been 
shown to vary with psychological characteristics (e.g., 
motivation; Kahle et al. 2000), demographic characteristics 
(e.g., education level; Basseches 1980), and characteristics of 
a decision problem (e.g., complex extended decisions; Kahle 
et al. 2000). The majority of research, however, has focused 
on documented differences in the proclivity to accept duality 
among individuals with distinct cultural backgrounds (e.g., 
cultures differentially influenced by Confucianism and 
Buddhism versus the Enlightenment and Christianity; 
Rothbaum and Tsang 1998) and individuals of varying 
maturity levels (e.g., younger versus older adults; Basseches 
1980). We first review cultural differences in the proclivity to 
accept duality and then turn to age differences, drawing 
attention in each case to the experience and acceptance of 
conflict particularly with respect to emotions.  
 
The Differential Acceptance of Duality Across Cultures 
 
The underlying tenet in Confucian and Buddhist 
philosophies is that reality is flexible and constantly changing. 
Therefore, contradictions are likely to be perceived as both 
natural and common. A guiding principle is holism, which 
suggests that all things must be understood in relation to 
everything else, and that entities can be opposed to one 
another and yet also be connected in time and space and be 
perceived as a whole. This principle is reflected in formal 
writings, such as the I Ching, as well as in more 
contemporary writings. In a recent content analysis of 
proverbs, for example, four times as many dialectical 
proverbs (proverbs that contain seeming contradictions; e.g., 
beware of your friends not your enemies) were found in 
Chinese than in American books (12% vs. fewer than 3%; 
Peng and Nisbett 1999). Moreover, dialectical proverbs tend 
to be preferred over nondialectical proverbs (proverbs that 
contain no contradictions; e.g., one against all is certain to 
fall) by Chinese individuals, while the opposite is true for 
Americans (Peng and Nisbett 1999; see also Briley, Morris 
and Simonson 2000). 
These philosophical traditions differ from those heavily 
influenced by the Enlightenment and Christianity. Western 
cultures, in particular, tend toward the rejection of duality in 
part due to the impact of Aristotelian logic, which 
emphasizes three key principles: the law of identity (i.e., 
things are what they are and nothing else), the law of non-
contradiction (i.e., no statement can be both true and false; 
thus A cannot equal not-A), and the law of the excluded 
middle (any statement is either true or false, implying that 
there is no middle ground). This philosophical tradition has 
limited the degree to which members of Aristotelian-
influenced cultures tend to engage in dialectical processing. 
Instead, this tradition tends to encourage more nondialectical 
processing, where the recognition of contradiction often 
leads to the (a) polarization of the sources of contradiction 
(e.g., focusing on one source to the exclusion of the other; 
Aaker and Sengupta 2000) or (b) integration of the opposing 
sources through taking multiple perspectives when thinking 
about the sources (Tetlock 1983).  
Differences in the acceptance of duality also manifest 
themselves within emotional constructs and the extent to 
which contradictory elements define them. For example, 
emotional associations with love vary across cultural 
contexts. A distinctive quality in Samoan romantic ties, for 
example, is co-existing feelings of alofa (nurturant, deep 
affection) and conflict or anxiety (Shore 1996). Similarly, 
emotional associations, as portrayed in popular love songs, 
also appear to vary (Rothbaum and Tsang 1998). While 
striking similarities in the expression of positive emotions 
such as desire, romanticism and passion are found in both 
Chinese and American love songs, a consistent culture-based 






difference in the frequency with which negative emotions are 
conveyed is also observed. That is, whereas American love 
songs appear to associate love either exclusively with positive 
or with negative emotions, Chinese love songs are more 
likely to associate love with both positive and negative 
emotions, such as suffering, mourning, and regret (Shaver, 
Wu and Schwartz 1992). 
More direct support for the premise that individuals in 
East Asian relative to North American cultures are more at 
ease with experiencing conflicting emotions is provided by 
Bagozzi et al. (1999). In one study, for example, the 
researchers asked individuals at the University of Michigan 
and University of Beijing to assess the felt intensity and 
frequency of their own emotions, both positive (e.g., 
happiness, joy, enjoyment) and negative (e.g., sadness, anger, 
anxiety). Results showed that negative and positive emotions 
were positively correlated for the Chinese individuals, but 
negatively correlated for the Americans. These culture-based 
differences appear to be consistent with the distinct ways of 
experiencing positive and negative events. For example, the 
Tao-te Ching epitomizes the dialectical view in Chinese 
culture, whereby a favorable event leads to the experience of 
a positive emotion, tempered by a negative emotion. When 
positive events occur, there is an inclination not to be overly 
happy, but rather to acknowledge that things may turn for 
the worse in the future.  
  
The Differential Acceptance of Duality with Age 
 
In addition to cultural differences in the proclivity to 
accept duality, considerable research has demonstrated that 
with maturity comes a greater ability to accept contradiction 
and synthesize contradicting elements — to engage in 
dialectical processing. It is hypothesized that concrete and 
post-formal operational reasoning, believed to develop in 
adolescence, may not be adequate to deal with the 
complexities of later life, particularly the intricacies of both 
internal and external changes that occur with major life crises 
or events (Basseches 1980). In support, while concrete 
operational reasoning remains stable across adult age groups, 
older adults tend to engage in more dialectical and relativistic 
processing than do comparably educated young adults 
(Kramer and Woodruff 1986). The propensity to engage in 
dialectical processing may relate to wisdom, such that 
experience leads to greater contextualization of 
understanding and relativism of values and life goals (Baltes 
and Staudinger 1993). 
Importantly, the enhanced ability of older adults to 
synthesize conflicting elements may be particularly true in the 
domain of emotions. Older adults are better able than 
younger adults to talk about their own emotional 
experiences, acknowledge complex feelings and endure the 
tension of conflict between mixed emotions (Labouvie-Vief, 
DeVoe and Bulka 1989). Moreover, they appear to be less 
disturbed by the ambiguity and uncertainty of emotionally-
laden problems than are young adults (Blanchard-Fields 
1997). Malatesta and Izard (1984) also observed that older, 
compared with younger, women had more complex facial 
expressions, where multiple emotions were combined in a 
single expression. Further, the positive correlation between 
the experience of positive and negative emotions increases 
with age, and the number of factors characterizing emotional 
experiences is positively associated with age (Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz and Turk Charles 1999). 
In sum, the research reviewed above suggests different 
ways in which a dialectic relationship between positive and 
negative emotions may exist, and therefore hints at different 
psychological consequences of experiencing conflicting 
emotions. Below, we review specific psychological outcomes 
that may result when exposed to mixed emotions, and posit 
how they may influence attitudes.   
 
Psychological Mechanism  
and the Role of Felt Discomfort 
 
Across a wide variety of domains, researchers examining 
conflict among cognitive or affective elements have 
suggested that negative affective states result from such 
conflict, and that these negative affective states must be 
addressed in some manner. The prototypical psychological 
research on the experience of conflict, cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger 1957), which refers to the inconsistency between 
two thoughts or between thoughts and actions, posits that 
such conflict creates uncomfortable tensions or discomfort, 
which in turn prompts cognitive re-appraisal of the 
underlying elements in order to alleviate the negative state. In 
consumer behavior, cognitive dissonance effects have been 
explored with respect to attitude change and repurchase 
tendencies, as well as the search for selective information by 
consumers (Cummings and Venkatesh 1976). 
Drawing upon cognitive dissonance theory, a number of 
researchers have provided insight into situations in which 
individuals experience emotional or affective inconsistency. 
For example, based on an examination of individual 
emotional behavior within the context of employing 
organizations, Hochschild (1983) argues that separation of 
experienced and expressed emotions leads to emotional 
dissonance. To reduce this dissonance, emotional laborers 
(those who, because of organizational norms, are forced to 
feign or fabricate emotions) must change their felt emotions 
or engage in “deep acting” to hide their true feelings. 
Relatedly, social psychologists have turned their attention to 
situations in which evaluations might be characterized as 
both highly positive and highly negative at the same time—
situations of attitude ambivalence (versus attitude neutrality 
or cases of predominantly positive or negative attitudes; e.g., 
Fong and Tiedens 2001). Like cognitive dissonance, attitude 
ambivalence is considered to be a bothersome, 
disharmonious state, and out of line with the typical desire 
for consistency and clear action tendencies (Cacioppo, 
Gardner and Berntson 1997; Priester and Petty 1996).  
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Importantly, however, some work has suggested that the 
generalizeability of these hypothesized feelings of discomfort 
in response to conflict may be limited based upon principles 
relevant to the propensity to accept duality. For example, 
Heine and Lehman (1997) show that the discomfort 
associated with cognitive dissonance does not arise for 
individuals with greater exposure to East Asian cultures. 
Therefore, the typical dissonance-driven re-appraisal of the 
underlying contradictory elements is less likely to occur for 
individuals with a higher propensity to accept duality. These 
results are consistent with the notion that, because of a 
greater degree of comfort associated with the experience and 
processing of duality, these individuals are less bothered by 
contradictions, perhaps seeing such conflict as more natural 
and expected. Consequently, they may be less likely to 
experience significant discomfort relative to individuals with 
lower proclivities to accept duality. 
The present research is unique from the literature 
reviewed above in that it focuses upon the simultaneous 
experience of two conflicting emotions, rather than 
discrepancies between cognitions, between expressed and felt 
emotions, or between positive and negative evaluations of 
attitude objects. However, we build upon this previous work, 
as well as upon research examining differences in the 
propensity to accept duality, to propose that simultaneously 
experiencing conflicting emotions will lead to feelings of 
uncomfortable inconsistency or psychological discomfort for 
individuals with a lower proclivity to accept duality. Among 
individuals with a higher proclivity to accept duality, less 
discomfort with the experience of emotional conflict is 
expected. More formally: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with a lower versus higher 
propensity to accept duality will experience greater feelings of 
discomfort in response to a mixed emotional appeal. 
 
 Furthermore, we suggest that the increased levels of 
discomfort that arise for individuals with a lower propensity 
to accept duality will lead to unfavorable attitudes toward the 
mixed emotional appeal. In contrast, individuals with a 
higher propensity to accept duality should feel lower levels of 
discomfort, and therefore should not hold unfavorable 
attitudes toward the mixed emotional appeal. In other words, 
we predict a differential attitudinal outcome toward the 
mixed emotional appeal by these two groups of individuals; a 
difference that should not occur when exposed to pure 
emotional appeals. More specifically: 
 
Hypothesis 2: For individuals with a lower versus higher 
propensity to accept duality, less favorable attitudes toward 
mixed emotional appeals should occur; in contrast, no such 
differences should arise for pure emotional appeals.  
 
We also examine the psychological processes that 
underlie the resolution of mixed emotions. We propose that 
feelings of discomfort will mediate the relationship between 
emotional appeals and attitudes for all individuals. However, 
and importantly, in the case of mixed emotional appeals, 
more feelings of discomfort should arise for individuals with 
a lower (versus higher) propensity to accept duality 
(Hypothesis 1), leading to less favorable attitudes toward the 
mixed emotional appeals (Hypothesis 2), consistent with a 
mediational role of discomfort for those with a lower 
propensity to accept duality. This proposed mediational role 
of discomfort should not hold in the case of individuals with 
a higher propensity to accept duality because discomfort 
should not arise in this group to the degree that it does for 
those with a lower propensity to accept duality after exposure 
to mixed emotional appeals. Throughout the research we 
focus on differential outcomes that are likely to be associated 
with emotional conflict across groups with lower versus 
higher propensity to accept duality, rather than any 
differences in the experience of such conflict. To provide 
convergent validity for these hypotheses, we operationalize 
the propensity to accept duality in two ways, through culture 
(experiments 1, 2) and age (experiment 3). 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: THE PROCESSING OF 
CONFLICTING EMOTIONS 
 
Overview and Design 
 
The objective of experiment 1 is to determine how 
individuals process and respond to emotional stimuli that 
incorporate two conflicting emotions. Therefore, we rely on 
a 3 (Emotional Appeal: Happy versus Sad versus Mixed) x 2 
(Culture: Asian American versus Anglo American) between-
subjects design, and predict a cross-over interaction between 
the independent variables. Happiness and sadness were 
chosen as the core emotions because they tend to be similarly 
experienced, recognized, and expressed across cultural 
contexts (Ekman and Friesen 1986; Matsumoto 1990). 
Further, they are often conceptualized as prototypical 
examples of emotions with opposing valence and evoke 
relatively similar levels of arousal, thereby limiting potential 
confounds (Russell and Carroll 1999). 
As in prior research (e.g., Briley et al. 2000), culture was 
operationalized through ethnic background, Asian American 
and Anglo American. This choice of sample helps to 
attenuate potential confounds often associated with country 
status (e.g., language differences, economic or political 
conditions). Furthermore, demographic and psychographic 
variability in the two samples could be limited, thereby 
further reducing noise in the sample. Finally, the use of these 
participants should provide a stronger test of our key 
propositions since within-culture samples tend to be more 





 To develop the mixed emotional appeal, a pretest was 
conducted in which Asian American (n = 11; 45% female, 
mean age = 19.9) and Anglo American (n = 13; 54% female, 






mean age = 20.4) undergraduate students were shown a set 
of four advertisements intended to evoke both happiness and 
sadness. All four appeals focused on photographic film, 
which was selected because persuasive appeals reflecting the 
intended emotion types could be created. Following Edell 
and Burke (1987), participants indicated the degree to which 
they experienced a set of emotions in response to each 
advertisement (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly). Further, we 
drew on prior literature (e.g., Edell and Burke 1987; 
Holbrook and Batra 1987; Izard 1977) to identify emotional 
items that would be used to measure felt emotional 
responses to the appeals. Prior research revealed less 
consensus on the items used to define sadness relative to 
happiness, thereby resulting in a larger number of sad (versus 
happy) items used in the current research: Three items were 
included to create a Happy index (happy, joyful, delighted; α 
= .90) and eight items were included to create a Sad index 
(downhearted, sad, depressed, regretful, lonely, distressed, 
discouraged, sorrowful; α = .89). Sixteen filler emotions were 
also included. The results of a one-way ANOVA on the 
Happy and Sad indices indicated that an appeal featuring a 
grandmother and baby led to no significant differences in felt 
happiness (M = 5.42) and sadness (M = 4.82; F (1, 23) < 1), 
thus best representing an emotional appeal that was a 
mixture of both emotions. No culture effects were found 
(F’s < 1).  
 
Participants and Procedure 
Experimental participants were from the same subject 
pool, all undergraduate students who participated in return 
for partial class credit or $5 and were run in small groups (n 
= 5-15). They were categorized into the two ethnic groups 
based on self-ratings: Anglo American participants were 
those who had indicated their ethnic background to be 
“Caucasian.” The Asian American participants were those 
who had indicated their ethnic background to be “Asian.” To 
provide additional evidence of cultural background, 
participants were asked their country of birth: 100% of the 
Anglo American population versus 15% of the Asian 
American population were born in the U.S. A total of 117 
Asian American (51% female, mean age = 24.2) and 87 
Anglo American (49% female, mean age = 22.5) 
undergraduate students were recruited for the study.  
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was 
to assess consumer responses to potential advertisements 
and they should view the appeal just as if they were reviewing 
it in a magazine. The stimuli contained a half-page color 
photograph of a grandmother (named Emma Carolyn Pratt) 
holding a baby (named Emma Carolyn Groves) on her lap. 
Emotion type was manipulated in the text next to the 
photograph. Participants in the happy emotion type 
condition read, “My Nana, Emma, still seems young and full 
of life…I love sharing time with her. I’m happy that she has 
lived long enough to get to know and help raise me.” Under 
the names of the grandmother and baby was a set of dates 
indicating their years of birth respectively: 1910 for the 
grandmother and 1997 for the baby. Participants in the sad 
condition read, “My Nana, Emma, passed away this past year 
after battling a long illness. I loved sharing time with her. I 
miss her.” Only one change occurred in the dates: both the 
grandmother’s date of birth (1910) and death (1998) were 
indicated next to her name (i.e., 1910-1998). This same set of 
dates was included in the mixed emotion condition; however, 
here participants read: “My Nana, Emma, passed away this 
past year after a full and happy life. I loved sharing time with 
her. I miss her, but am happy that she lived long enough to 
meet me.”  
To enhance external validity, positively valenced product 
content was included in the appeal and was held constant in 
all conditions (e.g., “Watson color film has top color quality 
– plus, the texture will always be sharp, never grainy. Just like 
life.”). As the key dependent variable, participants were asked 
to rate their attitudes toward the advertisement on a three-
item scale (Aad; 1 = bad, not at all likable, unfavorable; 7 = 
good, likable, favorable). In addition, they completed a series 
of ancillary measures including felt discomfort, manipulation 
checks for emotion type and demographic information. 




The data were analyzed based on a 3 (Emotion Type) x 
2 (Culture) between-subjects analysis of variance. Sample 
sizes ranged from 21 to 43 in each cell.  
 
Manipulation Checks 
As a check on emotion type, participants rated the 
extent to which they felt specific emotions after exposure to 
the appeal on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very). An 
overall 3 x 2 ANOVA on the Happy index (α = .89) yielded 
a main effect of emotion type (F (2, 198) = 19.31, p < .001) 
such that the happy emotional appeal led to more feelings of 
happiness (M = 4.22) than did either the sad (M = 2.87; F (1, 
198) = 37.22, p < .001) or mixed (M = 3.37; F (1,198)=17.01, 
p < .001) appeals. In addition, the mixed emotional appeal 
evoked more happy feelings than did the sad emotional 
appeal (F (1,198) = 5.64, p < .02). There were no other 
significant effects (F’s < 1). 
Similarly, a main effect of emotion type of the Sadness 
index (α = .89) occurred (F (2, 198) = 7.30, p < .001), 
whereby the sad appeal (M = 3.79) evoked more sad feelings 
than did the happy appeal (M = 2.94; F (1, 198) = 11.70, p < 
.001). The mixed appeal (M = 3.69) also evoked more sad 
feelings than the happy appeal (F (1, 198) = 10.24, p < .002). 
There was no difference in feelings of sadness evoked by the 
sad and mixed emotional appeals (F (1, 198) < 1). No other 
effects were significant (culture, F (1, 198) < 1; interaction, F 
(2, 198) = 1.76, p > .18). 
In addition to assessing positive and negative emotional 
indices individually, we combined them to create a measure 
of emotional ambivalence, or the degree to which emotional 
responses are truly mixed. To create the measure, we rely 
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upon the conceptualization and method discussed in 
Thompson, Zanna and Griffin (1995) where ambivalence is 
characterized by two necessary and sufficient conditions. 
First, both components must be of at least moderate 
intensity. Second, the two emotional components must be of 
similar magnitude, where both positive and negative 
emotions are felt to the same degree. A simplification of their 
similarity-intensity model predicts that ambivalence is a linear 
function of three times the conflicting reactions minus the 
dominant reactions, where whichever of the positive or 
negative reactions is greater in number is referred to as the 
dominant reaction (D) and whichever is lesser is referred to 
as the conflicting reaction (C). Thus, Ambivalence = 3C - D 
(Priester and Petty 1996). 
A 3 x 2 ANOVA of the ambivalence index revealed a 
main effect of emotion type (F (2, 198) = 10.29, p < .001), 
such that the mixed emotional appeal evoked significantly 
higher levels of ambivalence (M  = 4.42) than did either the 
happy (M  = 3.61; F (1, 198) = 2.85, p < .05) or sad (M  = 
2.19; F (1, 198) = 20.35, p < .0001) emotional appeals. No 
other effects were significant (culture, F (1, 198) < 1; 
interaction, F (1, 198) = 1.82, p > .17). 
 
Felt Discomfort 
To examine the process hypothesized to underlie the 
relation between emotion type and attitudes, an overall 3 x 2 
ANOVA was run on the Discomfort index (uncomfortable, 
conflicted, confused; α = .79; three items drawn from Edell 
and Burke 1987; Holbrook and Batra 1987; Izard 1977). A 3 
x 2 ANOVA yielded a main effect of emotion type (F (2, 
198) = 3.67, p < .03). Overall the mixed emotional appeal 
evoked more feelings of discomfort (M  = 3.68) than did the 
happy (M  = 2.97; F (1, 198) = 7.34, p < .01) emotional 
appeal. Contrasts revealed no significant difference in felt 
discomfort between the sad appeals (M  = 3.36) and mixed 
appeals (F (1, 198) = 1.37, p > .24), or between the happy 
and sad appeals (F (1, 198) = 1.94, p > .17). In addition, a 
marginal main effect of culture (F (1, 198) = 3.37, p < .07) 
was found: Anglo Americans experienced more discomfort 
(M  = 3.54) than did the Asian American participants (M  = 
3.14). However, both of these effects were driven by a 
significant two-way interaction (F (2, 198) = 3.02, p < .05), in 
support of Hypothesis 1. As predicted, planned contrasts 
showed that Anglo American participants had more feelings 
of discomfort in the mixed emotional appeal condition (M  = 
4.24) than did Asian American participants (M  = 3.11; F (1, 
198) = 10.58, p < .001). There were no significant culture-
based differences in response to the happy emotional appeal 
(M Anglo Americans = 3.01; MAsian Americans = 2.92; F (1, 198) < 1), 
or the sad emotional appeal (M Anglo Americans = 3.34; MAsian 
Americans = 3.38; F (1, 198) < 1). 
 
Attitudes 
To test Hypothesis 2, the overall 3 x 2 ANOVA was run 
on Aad (α = .95). The main effect of emotion type was 
significant (F (2, 198) = 9.94, p < .001) indicating more 
favorable attitudes in the happy (M  = 4.50) than sad (M  = 
3.46; F (1, 198) = 18.00, p < .001) or mixed (M  = 3.74; F (1, 
198) = 11.17, p < .01) appeal conditions. A follow-up 
contrast yielded no significant difference in attitudes between 
the mixed and sad appeals (F (1, 198) = 1.42, p > .24). In 
addition there was a main effect of culture (F (1, 198) = 3.96, 
p < .05) such that Asian Americans reported higher attitudes 
overall (M  = 4.09) compared with Anglo Americans (M  = 
3.71). However, this effect was driven by a culture by 
emotion type interaction (F (2, 198) = 3.14, p < .05). Planned 
contrasts showed that the interaction was due to responses to 
the mixed emotional appeal condition such that Anglo 
American participants had less favorable attitudes than did 
Asian American participants (F (1, 198) = 11.34, p < .001), in 
support of Hypothesis 2. In contrast, no culture-based 
differences were found in response to the pure emotional 
appeals (F’s < 1). Specifically, Anglo American participants 
had more favorable attitudes toward the happy (M  = 4.41) 
than the sad (M  = 3.49; F (1, 198), p < .02) or mixed (M  = 
3.22; F (1, 198) = 12.16, p < .001) appeals. There was no 
significant difference in attitudes among Asian American 
participants for the happy (M  = 4.59) and mixed (M  = 4.26; 
F (1, 198) = 1.24, p > .26) emotional appeals, and both were 
preferred over the sad appeal (M  = 3.43; p’s < .01).  
 
Process of Mediation 
To shed light on whether the culture effect (Anglo 
Americans versus Asian Americans) on attitude towards the 
ad continues to be significant when felt discomfort is 
introduced as mediator, a mediation analysis was run 
focusing on just the mixed emotional appeal ad. Following 
Baron and Kenny (1986), four regressions (a-d below) were 
conducted. Consistent with (a), Asian Americans had more 
favorable attitudes toward the mixed emotional appeal than 
did Anglo Americans (β = .38, p < .05). Further (b), Asian 
Americans reported less discomfort after exposure to the 
mixed emotional appeal than did Anglo Americans (β = -.45, 
p < .05). In addition, as predicted (c), higher levels of 
discomfort led to less favorable attitudes (β = -.49 p < 
.0001). Finally (d), discomfort was a significant predictor of 
attitudes (β = -.47, p < .0001), while culture was not a 
significant predictor of attitudes (β = .16, p > .36). Together, 
these four regressions provide support for the premise that 
feelings of discomfort mediate the relationship between the 
mixed emotional appeal and attitudes, but only for Anglo 
Americans participants. 
To shed additional insight on the underlying process, we 
also conducted a mediated moderation analysis (Baron and 
Kenny 1986) that allowed us to examine the full model rather 
than just focusing on the mixed emotional appeals. A dummy 
variable was created for the moderating variable, propensity 
to accept duality. Further, two dummy variables were 
included in the regression equations to capture the effects of 
the three emotional appeal conditions. The sad emotional 
condition was used as the baseline comparative condition. 
Next, four regressions (a-d below) were conducted to assess 
the hypothesized mediated moderation relationship. First, 






both Aad and feelings of discomfort were regressed on 
propensity to accept duality, as well as each of the emotion 
type dummy variables and then upon interactions between 
culture and each of the emotion type dummies. Results 
indicated (a) a significant effect of emotion type on attitudes, 
indicating more favorable attitudes after exposure to the 
happy (β = 1.27, p < .001) and mixed (β = .92, p < .01) 
appeals relative to the sad appeal. In addition, there was an 
interaction effect between propensity to accept duality and 
the mixed emotional appeal condition (β = -1.19, p < .01), 
indicating lower attitudes for the mixed emotional appeal 
among those with a lower propensity to accept duality, as 
predicted. For (b), the results for the same model with 
discomfort indicated only an interactive effect between 
propensity to accept duality and the mixed emotional appeal 
(β = 1.17, p < .03), such that feelings of discomfort arose 
only for those with a lower propensity to accept duality after 
exposure to the mixed emotional appeal. Next (c), 
discomfort was a significant predictor of Aad (β = -.49, p < 
.001), such that greater feelings of discomfort lowered overall 
attitudes. Finally (d), Aad was regressed against feelings of 
discomfort, propensity to accept duality, dummy variables 
for the emotion type conditions and the interactive terms 
between those emotion type dummy variables and propensity 
to accept duality. In this analysis, discomfort remained a 
significant predictor of attitudes (β = -.44, p < .001), as did 
the dummy variables for emotion type (happy β = 1.05, p < 
.001; mixed β = .80, p < .002).  However, the interactive 
effect between mixed emotions and propensity to accept 
duality was no longer significant (β = -.68, p > .11), 
consistent with the mediated moderation hypothesis. 
It should be noted that this mediated moderation 
analysis was also conducted in the two subsequent 
experiments; the results mirrored the above with one 
exception.  In experiment 3, the beta value of the interaction 
significantly decreases but remains a significant predictor in 
equation (d), consistent with partial mediation.  For more 




Results of this experiment show that while there were 
no cultural differences in the experience of happiness and 
sadness in response to either the pure or mixed emotional 
appeals, there were important differences in how individuals 
from the two cultures responded to the conflict in the mixed 
emotional appeal. Anglo American participants had more 
favorable attitudes towards a happy emotional appeal relative 
to a sad or mixed emotional appeal, while Asian American 
participants had more favorable attitudes toward both the 
happy and mixed emotional appeals relative to the sad 
emotional appeal. The most salient difference in this overall 
pattern of attitudes was driven by the mixed emotional 
appeal, where significantly less favorable attitudes were found 
for Anglo American relative to Asian American participants. 
The mediation analysis provided some insight into why this 
effect occurred: feelings of discomfort appear to mediate the 
relationship between the emotional appeals for Anglo 
American but not for Asian American participants. Further 
evidence shows that this effect was not driven by differences 
in the meaning of discomfort, as both Anglo American and 
Asian American participants had more negative attitudes 
when they experienced discomfort. Instead, it was the 
relationship between mixed emotional appeals and feelings of 
discomfort that varied with cultural background. Thus, the 
results of experiment 1 are supportive of the premise that 
differences in the proclivity to accept emotion-based 
contradiction influence emotional experience and subsequent 
attitudes. 
However, there is at least one area of potential concern 
in experiment 1. This experiment focused on culture-based 
differences in felt emotional responses to pure and mixed 
emotional appeals that lead to different patterns of attitudes. 
It is possible, however, that the results are instead being 
driven by differences in emotional perception. Thus, the 
effects may be the result of differing appraisals of the 
emotional content rather than differing emotional responses 
to that content. 
Emotion theorists have argued that a cognitively-based 
appraisal process precedes the actual experience of emotion 
(Smith and Ellsworth 1985). These appraisal processes, 
which are believed to be ongoing and automatic tendencies 
necessary for interpreting the environment, may lead to 
subsequent arousal and emotional response if, for example, 
the appraised object is perceived to be adequately self-
relevant. Similarly, consumer behavior researchers suggest 
that individuals appraise the emotional content depicted in 
persuasion appeals (Burke and Edell 1989), and that such 
appraisals may lead to felt emotional responses (Stout, 
Homer and Liu 1990). However, while felt and depicted 
emotions are often highly correlated, there are some 
conditions under which the two constructs may be distinct 
(e.g., highly arousing emotions; Stout et al. 1990). Therefore, 
despite our intention to focus on felt emotional responses, 
participants with distinct cultural backgrounds may have 
perceived the emotional appeals differently. If so, the pattern 
of results may be based on underlying differences in emotion 
recognition rather than differences in emotional responses. 
Experiment 2 is conducted to address this question.  
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2: DISENTANGLING FELT AND 
RECOGNIZED EMOTIONS 
 
Overview and Design 
 
The primary objective of experiment 2 is to disentangle 
felt versus depicted emotions by examining differences in 
emotional appraisal and emotional arousal across cultural 
contexts, as well as the impact of those differences on 
attitudes toward mixed and pure emotional appeals. A 
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second objective is to provide generalizeability of the results 
found in experiment 1. To reduce the possibility that the 
results obtained are due to unique aspects of the film product 
category or the visual nature of the stimuli, experiment 2 
relies on a different product category as well as exclusively 
verbal (non-pictorial) emotional appeals. Therefore, the 
design used is a 3 (Emotion Type: Happy versus Sad versus 
Mixed) x 2 (Culture: Asian American versus Anglo 





To develop the happy, sad and mixed emotional appeals, 
a pretest was conducted in which Asian American (n = 36; 
78% female, mean age = 25.8) and Anglo American (n = 47; 
61% female, mean age = 25.4) graduate and undergraduate 
students were shown a set of three advertisements intended 
to evoke happiness, sadness or both happiness and sadness. 
The appeals focused on a fictitious moving company 
(Transportex Movers). A moving company was used 
because, similar to film, persuasive appeals reflecting the 
intended emotion types could easily be created. Emotion 
type was manipulated in the text. Those in the happy 
emotion condition read: “You’ve been looking forward to 
this moment for so long. A new chapter in your life is just 
beginning, and the future is full of exciting possibilities. You 
are looking forward to moving to a new neighborhood and 
the new friends you’ll make.  It’s a happy and exhilarating 
time -- you want movers who understand this. Movers who 
will make the move fun. Movers you can trust. Let 
Transportex handle the details—and all you have to do is 
enjoy the ride!”  Participants in the sad condition read: 
“You’ve been dreading this moment, but it’s finally arrived. 
A chapter in your life is ending, and the future is still 
uncertain. You’ll miss the neighborhood and the friends 
you’ve made. It’s a sad and nostalgic time -- you want movers 
who understand this. Movers who won’t make the move 
more stressful than it already is.  Movers you can trust. Let 
Transportex handle the details—and you won’t have any 
unhappy memories.”  Participants in the mixed emotion 
condition read the following: “The moment has finally 
arrived.  A chapter in your life is ending, but another one is 
beginning. You’ll miss the neighborhood and the friends 
you’ve made, but you’re also looking forward to the future 
and the exciting possibilities it holds. It’s such a sad and a 
happy time, but it doesn’t have to be stressful, too -- you 
want movers who understand this. Movers you can trust. Let 
Transportex handle the details—all you have to do is look 
back on your old life, and look forward to your new one.”   
Participants indicated the degree to which they 
experienced a set of emotions in response to each 
advertisement (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly), identical to 
those examined in experiment 1. A 3 x 2 between-subjects 
ANOVA on the Happy index (α = .92) yielded a main effect 
of emotion type (F (2, 79) = 17.26, p < .001): the happy 
emotional appeal led to more feelings of happiness (M  = 
4.21) than did either the sad (M  = 2.14; F (1, 79) = 26.83, p 
< .001) or mixed (M  = 2.67; F (1, 79) = 16.19, p < .001) 
emotional appeals. In addition, the mixed emotional appeal 
evoked marginally more happy feelings than did the sad 
emotional appeal (F (1, 79) = 2.25, p < .07). There were no 
other significant effects (F’s < 1). Similarly, there was a main 
effect of emotion type of the Sadness index (α = .93; F (2, 
79) = 14.39, p < .001), whereby the sad appeal (M  = 3.43) 
evoked more sad feelings than did the happy (M  = 1.82; F 
(1, 79)  = 11.70, p < .001) or the mixed (M  = 2.42; F (1, 79)  
= 3.32, p < .07) emotional appeals. The mixed appeal also 
evoked more sad feelings than the happy appeal (F (1, 79)  = 
11.56, p < .001). No other effects were significant (F’s < 1).  
 
Participants and Procedure 
A total of 70 Asian American (59% female, mean age = 
20.2) and 59 Anglo American (44% female, mean age = 20.7) 
undergraduate students participated in the study in return for 
partial course credit and were run in small groups (n = 5-15). 
As in experiment 1, participants were told that the purpose 
of the study was to assess responses to the copy for potential 
advertisements and were instructed to review the written 
copy of an advertisement for a moving company. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the three emotion 
type conditions. The primary dependent variable, Aad, 
remained the same as in experiment 1. However, unique to 
experiment 2 was an additional set of emotion measures. 
Participants completed two separate scales regarding: (1) felt 
emotional responses to the appeals, and (2) recognition of 
emotions depicted in the appeals (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
strongly). The same set of emotional items used in 
experiment 1 was used to measure both felt and depicted 
emotions. However, the instructions differed. Adapted from 
Edell and Burke (1987), participants were either first 
instructed, “We would like you to tell us what types of 
emotions the ad depicts or is trying to depict. In this 
question, we are not interested in your own feelings or 
emotional reactions to the ad, but rather in what emotions 
you think the ad was trying to depict” (depicted emotions 
measure) or “We would like you to tell us how the ad you 
just saw made you feel. In this question we are interested in 
your feelings or emotional reactions to the ad, not how you 
would describe it or the emotions you think the ad was trying 
to depict” (felt emotions measure, same as that used in study 
1 to assess emotional responses), the order of which was 
counterbalanced across subjects. Finally, participants 




A 3 (Emotion Type) x 2 (Culture) x 2 (Question Order) 
yielded no main or interactive effect of order (felt or depicted 
emotions asked first, F’s < 1). Thus, the data were analyzed 
via a 3 (Emotion Type) x 2 (Culture) between-subjects 
ANOVA. Sample sizes ranged from 16 to 26 in each cell. 
 







To determine the extent to which the appeals depicted 
the emotions intended, an overall 3 x 2 ANOVA was 
conducted on the depicted Happy index (α= .88) and yielded 
a significant main effect of emotion type (F (2, 124) = 19.99, 
p < .001; mhappy = 5.08, msad = 2.92, mmixed = 3.99; all contrasts 
p’s < .01). No other effects were significant (F’s < 1). 
Similarly, a 3 x 2 ANOVA on the depicted Sadness index (α 
= .90) yielded a main effect of emotion type (F (2, 122) = 
22.89, p < .001; mhappy = 1.94, msad = 3.67, mmixed = 3.20). 
Contrasts showed differences in perceptions of sadness 
depicted in the happy and sad appeals (F (1, 122) = 42.53, p 
< .001) and between the happy and mixed appeals (F (1, 122) 
= 22.48, p < .001). There was a marginally significant 
difference in perceptions of depicted sadness between the 
sad and mixed appeals (F (1, 122) = 3.00, p < .09). No other 
effects were significant (culture, F < 1; interaction, F (2, 122) 
= 1.05, p > .35). See Table 1 for means. 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
To determine the extent to which different felt 
emotional responses were evoked from the appeals, an 
overall 3 x 2 ANOVA conducted on the felt Happy index (α 
= .88) revealed a main effect of emotion type (F (2, 123) = 
4.66, p < .01). The happy appeal (M  = 3.44) evoked greater 
feelings of happiness than did the sad appeal (M  = 2.45; F (1, 
123) = 9.21, p < .01), and marginally greater feelings of 
happiness than the mixed appeal (M  = 2.87; F (1, 123) = 
3.01, p < .09). There was no difference in happy feelings 
evoked by the sad and mixed emotional appeals (F (1, 123) = 
1.58, p > .21). No other effects were significant (culture, F (1, 
123) = 1.44, p > .23; interaction, F (1, 123) < 1). Analysis on 
the felt Sadness index (α = .92) yielded a main effect of 
emotion type (F (2, 123) = 9.63, p < .001; Mhappy = 2.07, Msad 
= 3.35, Mmixed = 2.69; all contrast p’s < .05). No other effects 
were significant (F’s < 1).   
A 3 x 2 ANOVA of the ambivalence index revealed a 
main effect of emotion type (F (1, 122) = 2.27, p < .05) such 
that the mixed emotional appeal evoked higher levels of 
ambivalence (M  = 3.58) compared with both the happy (M  
= 2.33; F (1, 122) = 4.15, p < .05) and sad (M  = 2.56; F (1, 
122) = 2.62, p < .05) appeals.  No other effects were 
significant (F’s < 1). 
Importantly, these results demonstrate that the appeals 
both (a) conveyed the intended emotional content and, (b) 
evoked the intended emotional responses across conditions.  
 
Felt Discomfort 
A 3 x 2 analysis of the felt Discomfort index (α = .87) 
revealed a main effect of emotion type (F (2, 122) = 10.33, p 
< .001), such that the mixed emotional appeal (M  = 3.56) 
evoked more discomfort than did either the happy (M  = 
2.21; F (1, 122) = 20.37, p < .001) or, marginally, the sad (M  
= 2.99; F  (1, 122) = 3.45, p < .07) appeals. A main effect of 
culture also emerged (F (1, 122) = 10.47, p < .002), with 
Anglo American participants (M  = 3.32) experiencing more 
discomfort overall than Asian American participants (M  = 
2.53). Importantly, these effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction (F (2, 122) = 7.26, p < .001), whereby 
Anglo American participants (M  = 4.54) experienced more 
discomfort in response to the mixed emotional appeal than 
did Asian American participants (M   = 2.59; F (1, 122) = 
20.29, p < .001), consistent with Hypothesis 1. There were no 
significant culture-based differences in response to the happy 
emotional appeal (F (1, 122) < 1) or the sad emotional appeal 
(F (1, 122) = 2.19, p > .10); see Table 1 for means. 
 
Attitudes 
Hypothesis 2 was tested based on the overall 3 x 2 
ANOVA on Aad (α = .90). As in experiment 1, there was no 
main effect of culture (F (1, 124) < 1), though there was an 
effect of emotion type (F (2, 124) = 5.55, p < .01). More 
favorable attitudes resulted from exposure to the happy 
appeal (M  = 4.24) than to the sad appeal (M  = 3.42; F (1, 
124) = 10.99, p < .001), as well as from the mixed appeal (M  
= 3.92) compared to the sad appeal (F (1, 124) = 3.91, p < 
.05). Contrasts revealed no significant difference in attitudes 
between the happy and mixed emotional appeals (F (1, 124) 
= 1.70, p > .19). This main effect of emotion type was 
qualified by an emotion type and culture interaction (F (2, 
124)= 3.46; p < .04). As in experiment 1, the interaction was 
driven by differences in attitudes toward the mixed emotional 
appeal; Anglo American participants (M  = 3.54) had less 
favorable attitudes than did Asian American participants (M  
= 4.30; F (1, 124) = 4.61, p < .03), while no such differences 
occurred when exposed to the pure emotional appeals 
(mixed versus sad F (1, 124) < 1; mixed versus happy F (1, 
124) = 2.34, p > .14), supporting Hypothesis 2. Specifically, 
Anglo American participants had more favorable evaluations 
of the happy appeal than of the sad (F (1, 124) = 7.83, p < 
.01) or mixed (F (1, 124) = 7.22, p < .01) appeals. In contrast, 
there were no differences in evaluations by the Asian 
American participants for the happy and mixed appeals (F (1, 
124) < 1); both were again preferred relative to the sad 
appeal (p’s < .05); see Table 1 for means.  
 
Process of Mediation 
To provide more direct support for the process 
hypothesized to underlie the results, a mediational analysis 
identical to that reported for experiment 1 was conducted. 
Consistent with (a), Asian Americans had more favorable 
attitudes toward the mixed appeal than did Anglo Americans 
(β = .76, p < .02). Further (b), Asian Americans reported less 
discomfort after exposure to the mixed emotional appeal 
than did Anglo Americans (β = -1.95, p < .0001). In addition 
(c), higher levels of discomfort led to less favorable attitudes 
(β = -.21, p < .04). Finally, in a full model of effects (d), 
discomfort was a significant predictor of attitudes (β = -.22, p 
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< .04), while culture was not a significant predictor of 




The results of experiment 2 provide evidence of 
generalizeability for the basic result found in experiment 1. 
Again, we find that Anglo American participants prefer 
happy emotional appeals to sad or mixed appeals, and 
feelings of discomfort appear to account for the lowered 
attitudinal responses to the mixed appeals. In contrast, Asian 
American participants had similar attitudes toward the happy 
and mixed emotional appeals, and feelings of discomfort 
played no mediating role with respect to attitudes toward 
mixed appeals. More importantly, however, the results 
suggest that the observed attitudinal differences were due to 
felt emotional responses rather than recognition of the 
emotions depicted in the mixed appeals.  
By disentangling felt versus depicted emotions, 
experiment 2 sheds light on both the differences and 
similarities between the two constructs for individuals with 
distinct cultural backgrounds. The results indicate that each 
appeal type was perceived to depict similar emotional content 
across cultures, consistent with the intended manipulations. 
These results corroborate past research documenting 
similarities in the extent to which individuals with distinct 
cultural backgrounds appraise and recognize emotions (Smith 
and Ellsworth 1985). Moreover, there were no differences 
across cultural groups with respect to the experience of 
happiness and sadness in response to either the pure or 
mixed emotional appeals. Instead, the results demonstrate 
that experienced discomfort mediates attitudes for 
individuals with cultural backgrounds that do not embrace 
duality, resulting in lowered attitudes toward mixed 
emotional appeals.   
Experiments 1 and 2 provide support for the 
hypothesized attitude and processing differences between 
those with a higher versus lower propensity to accept duality, 
when propensity to accept duality is operationalized through 
cultural background. However, there are limitations to this 
particular operationalization. For example, there is no 
measurement scale to assess differential tendencies to accept 
duality, thereby limiting the ability to provide manipulation 
checks for this key construct. It is possible that potential 
confounding variables, which may not have been controlled 
for but may vary with cultural background (e.g., socio-
economic status), could account for the pattern of results. To 
further examine the validity of the proposed underlying 
construct, experiment 3 examines variation in propensity to 
accept duality based on age differences. To the degree that a 
similar pattern of results occurs, both in terms of attitude and 
mediational measures, corroborative evidence of the 






AGE AS AN ANTECEDENT TO THE 
ACCEPTANCE OF DUALITY 
 
Overview and Design 
 
The primary objective of experiment 3 is to examine the 
robustness of the effects found in experiments 1 and 2 by 
focusing on age, instead of cultural background, to 
manipulate the differences in propensity to accept duality. 
We expect the same set of effects as predicted and found in 
experiments 1 and 2. While experiment 3 relies on the same 
context as in experiment 1 (film product category), only a 
partial design is used to replicate the effects due to difficulties 
in obtaining participants in the older sample. Since the pure 
sad advertisement was a conceptual replication of the pure 
happy ad, but one that is less externally valid, we eliminated 
the sad advertisement condition.  Thus, we rely on a 2 
(Emotion Type: Happy versus Mixed) x 2 (Age: Younger 




While the methodology used in experiment 1 was 
replicated in experiment 3, the two groups of participants 
varied in their profiles. The participants in the younger age 
group remained Anglo American undergraduate students (n 
= 40; 42% female, mean age = 21.1 years), who completed 
the experiment in return for partial course credit and were 
run in small groups (n = 5-15). Participants in the older adult 
age group (n = 48; 72% female, mean age = 73.2 years) were 
recruited from two senior citizen’s homes. Prior to the 
experiment, the elderly participants were screened for major 
health problems (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease) that would impair 
their ability to complete the experiment. In addition, only 
those volunteers who indicated having completed at least two 
years of college were allowed to participate, thus minimizing 
differences in educational background among the younger 
(all of whom were third or fourth year undergraduates) and 
older participants. Participants from one senior citizen’s 
home (20% of the older adult sample) were paid $10 each in 
return for their involvement in the research, while those 
from the second facility agreed to participate in return for a 
$10 donation for each participant to their home’s general 
activity fund. The older participants were also run in groups 
(n = 12-20). All other aspects of the study remained the same 




The data were analyzed based on a 2 (Emotion Type) x 
2 (Age) between-subjects ANOVA. Sample sizes ranged 
from 15 to 27 in each cell. 
 
Manipulation Checks 
An overall 2 x 2 ANOVA on the Happy index (α = .90) 
yielded no main effect of emotion type (F (1, 81) = 1.01, p > 






.32). However, a main effect of age was found (F (1, 81) = 
6.35, p < .01), with older adults expressing more feelings of 
happiness overall (M  = 4.30) than the young adults (M  = 
3.35), an effect which is consistent with prior literature 
(Lawton, Kleban and Dean 1993). The interaction was not 
significant (F (1, 81) = 1.64, p > .20). The same 2 x 2 
ANOVA on the Sadness index (α = .87) revealed a main 
effect of emotion type (F (1, 76)= 12.87, p < .001; Mhappy = 
2.65, Mmixed = 3.58), indicating that the mixed appeal 
provoked more feelings of sadness, as intended. There was 
also a significant main effect of age (F (1, 76) = 19.39, p < 
.001), such that younger adults felt more sadness (M  = 3.68) 
relative to older adults (M  = 2.54). The interaction was again 
not significant (F (1, 76)= 1.62, p > .21). For means, see 
Table 2. 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA of the ambivalence index revealed a 
significant main effect of emotion type (F (1, 76) = 6.26, p < 
.02) with the mixed emotional appeal (M  = 4.70) evoking 
more ambivalence than the happy appeal (M  = 3.01). There 
was no significant main effect of age group (F (1, 76) = 2.17, 
p >  .15) or interaction between emotion type and age (F (1, 
76) = 1.50, p > .23). 
 
      ----------------------------------------------------- 




        An overall 2 x 2 ANOVA on the Discomfort index (α= 
.68'àyiele¥d a marginal main effect of emotion type (F (1, 78) 
= 2.90, p < .09), such that greater discomfort was felt in 
response to the mixed (M  = 3.39) versus happy (M  = 2.82) 
emotional appeal. In addition, there was a main effect of age 
(F (1, 78) = 8.75, p < .01), with the older adult participants 
experiencing less discomfort (M  = 2.61) than the younger 
participants (M  = 3.61). As the interaction between the two 
factors was at least marginally significant (F (1, 78) = 2.67, p 
< .06), planned contrasts consistent with hypothesized 
effects were conducted (Aiken and West 1991). As predicted, 
younger participants experienced greater feelings of 
discomfort (M   = 4.17) in response to the mixed emotional 
appeal than did older adults (M   = 2.62, F (1, 78) = 10.58, p 
< .01), consistent with Hypothesis 1. In contrast, there were 
no significant differences between the two age groups in the 
case of the happy ad (F (1, 78) < 1). 
 
Attitudes 
The hypothesis regarding the effects of age and emotion 
type on Aad (α = .95) was tested based on the same overall 2 
x 2 ANOVA. Results revealed a marginal main effect of age 
(F (1, 75)= 3.25, p < .08), with the older adults expressing 
more favorable attitudes (M  = 4.54) than the younger 
participants (M  = 3.84). This effect was qualified by an 
interaction between age and emotion type (F (1, 75) = 5.74, p 
< .02). While no significant attitudinal differences occurred 
in response to the happy emotional appeal (F (1, 75) < 1), 
younger participants (M  = 3.23) had less favorable attitudes 
in the mixed emotional appeal than did older participants (M  
= 4.87; F (1, 75) = 8.74, p < .01), as predicted by Hypothesis 
2. There was no effect of emotion type (F (1, 75) < 1).  
 
Process of Mediation 
To provide more direct support for the process 
hypothesized to drive the results, a mediation regression 
analysis was again conducted. Consistent with (a), older 
adults had more favorable attitudes toward the mixed 
emotional appeal than did younger adults (β = .35, p < .04). 
Further (b), older adults reported less discomfort after 
exposure to the mixed emotional appeal than did younger 
adults (β = -.51, p < .01). In addition (c), higher levels of 
discomfort led to less favorable attitudes (β = -.56, p < 
.0001). Finally, in the full model (d), discomfort was a 
significant predictor attitudes (β = -.54, p < .0001), while age 
was not (β = .10, p > .59), again consistent with the 




The results of both experiments 1 and 2 suggest that 
individuals with a cultural background that tends to not 
embrace duality, relative to those with a cultural background 
that embraces duality to a greater degree, have less favorable 
attitudes toward a mixed emotional appeal. The findings in 
experiment 3 corroborate those results by relying on another 
antecedent to the acceptance of duality, level of maturity as 
operationalized through age.  It should be noted that the use 
of both culture and age to manipulate the propensity to 
accept duality has limitations. For example, in the case of 
culture-based effects, there are potential confounds (e.g., 
socio-economic background) that may co-vary with cultural 
background and could explain the results. Similarly, for age-
based effects, the results may be due to an increased comfort 
that older participants have toward the mixed emotional 
appeal because of a heightened ability to identify themselves 
with the elderly grandmother portrayed in the appeal. 
However, the use of multiple operationalizations of the 
acceptance of duality and the robustness of the findings 
across the three experiments helps to address, at least in part, 
these issues. Together, the results help provide evidence of 
the mediating effect of discomfort and shed light on the 




The objective of this research was to understand the 
psychological impact of mixed emotions on attitudes, and 
shed insight on how this relationship varies based on the 
level of discomfort that individuals experience when exposed 
to mixed emotions. The results of experiment 1 show that 
individuals with a lower versus higher propensity to accept 
duality have more negative attitudes toward mixed emotional 
appeals. Such attitudinal differences do not occur after 
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exposure to pure emotional appeals. Importantly, these 
negative attitudes were not a result of a focus on the negative 
emotion in the stimulus. Rather, they were driven by the 
experience of a third independent emotion: discomfort. 
Mixed emotional appeals led to heightened levels of 
discomfort for individuals with a lower versus higher 
propensity to accept duality, which in turn led to more 
negative attitudes. Importantly, experiment 2 provides 
evidence that the effects are driven by differences in felt 
emotional responses rather than differences in the 
recognition of the emotions in the appeals. Finally, 
experiment 3 replicates the above effect but operationalizes 
propensity to accept duality by relying on younger versus 
older individuals, thereby providing convergent evidence for 
the generalizeability of the basic effect. 
Through these three experiments, the current research 
aims to contribute to literatures in consumer behavior on 
emotion and persuasion, as well as that in psychology. In 
these literatures, researchers have focused primarily on 
understanding the role of pure emotions in emotion-based 
persuasion processes (e.g., Burke and Edell 1986; Holbrook 
and Batra 1987) and in the recognition and expression of 
emotions (e.g., Matsumoto 1990; Russell 1994). This paper 
attempts to extend this research into the domain of mixed 
emotions where multiple emotions are contained in the same 
stimulus. In doing so, we hope to shed light on the types of 
reactions that individuals experience when exposed to mixed 
emotions by showing that differences in proclivity to accept 
duality lead to differences in discomfort as a response to 
mixed emotions, and that these reactions influence attitudes 
and lead to differential persuasive outcomes.   
From a broader perspective, the present research adds to 
a growing interest in consumer research on experiences of 
duality or paradox. Most of this research has focused on 
conflict experienced during the act of consumption and the 
emotional outcomes of such conflict. The current set of 
studies extends this stream of research by focusing on 
conditions in which there is conflict between emotions, and 
specifically examining the felt discomfort that results from 
that emotional conflict.  Importantly, however, this felt 
discomfort only arises for certain individuals, namely those 
with a lower propensity to accept duality. For those with a 
higher propensity to accept duality, this negative third 
emotion does not result.  Indeed, favorable attitudes, similar 
to those found in response to the happy appeal, resulted for 
those with a higher propensity to accept duality.  This finding 
suggests that the use of mixed emotional appeals may be an 
effective advertising strategy when targeting consumers with 
an Asian background or the elderly, two markets that may be 
particularly important given trends in global marketing and 
demographics. 
The current research also has several limitations that 
deserve attention in future research. For example, the actual 
simultaneous experience of mixed emotions merits additional 
empirical exploration. Though we measure both positive and 
negative emotional reactions to the mixed emotional appeal 
and find that they do co-occur, future research is needed to 
provide a more direct measure of mixed emotional 
experience (see Diener 1999; Larsen et al. in press; Priester 
and Petty 1996), specifically one that may provide greater 
insight into whether mixed emotions are truly experienced 
simultaneously. Similarly, future research is needed to 
provide measures that directly assess the propensity to accept 
duality, and yield deeper insight into the types of antecedents 
that lead to differential propensities to accept duality. The 
results of this research suggest that one such antecedent is 
culture, which is consistent with prior findings. For example, 
Shore (1996) argues that socialization and child rearing in 
Samoa, relative to the United States, foster the experience of 
ambivalence. However, the specific aspect of culture that 
serves to influence the experience of mixed emotions 
remains unclear. 
Another area for future exploration involves identifying 
potential conditions under which individuals with low 
propensity to accept duality might not experience discomfort 
after exposure to mixed emotional appeals. Are there 
mitigating conditions under which the effects documented 
for those with a low propensity to accept duality may be 
muted? One possibility involves conditions under which one 
emotion may dominate the other, rather than conflicting 
emotions experienced in equal intensity. Recent unpublished 
research begins to address this question by relying on a 
priming manipulation to increase the salience of one emotion 
(happy) relative to the other (sad) in the mixed emotional 
appeal. Results show that after receiving the happy prime, 
Asian Americans did not change their attitudes relative to the 
neutral prime condition.  Interestingly, after receiving a 
happy prime, the attitudes of Anglo American participants 
toward a mixed appeal were more favorable than in a neutral 
prime condition.  
In addition, while the current research suggests that 
mixed emotions lead to positive outcomes for those with a 
relatively high proclivity to accept duality, it does not offer 
insight as to why this effect occurs. Previous research has 
shown that not only are dialectic relations often preferred in 
cultures characterized by a high propensity to accept duality, 
but also that such relationships tend to be more common. 
For example, dialectic proverbs tend to be more commonly 
used in Chinese than American traditions (Choi and Nisbett 
2000). Thus, it is likely that for those with a relatively high 
propensity to accept duality, evidence of dialectic 
relationships in their environments are seen as natural, salient 
and commonplace. As a result, mixed emotional appeals may 
be perceived as more reflective of reality for those with a 
high propensity to accept duality, resulting in the observed 
favorable responses. To examine this premise, additional 
recent unpublished research asked participants to listen to 
radio advertisements for a moving company (based upon the 
current experiment 2). After participants rated their attitudes 
toward the appeal, they were asked their perceptions of 
verisimilitude for each appeal type. Asian Americans rated 
the mixed emotional appeal higher on verisimilitude than did 
Anglo Americans, and perceived it to have higher levels of 
verisimilitude than either the happy or sad appeals. By 






contrast, Anglo Americans found the happy appeal to have 
the highest degree of verisimilitude. In addition, 
verisimilitude was also found to act as a mediator on 
attitudes toward the mixed emotional appeal, but only for 
those with a relatively high propensity to accept duality. 
While preliminary, this study suggests that the use of mixed 
emotions in appeals may be a preferred and more effective 
method of persuasion among advertisers targeting individuals 
with a high propensity to accept duality. There are, however, 
several issues to explore in this research including a full 
understanding of the conceptual relationship between 
verisimilitude and felt discomfort across the two cultural 
groups.  
Finally, the present work suggests a rich research area in 
the examination of distinctions between and consequences of 
emotional versus cognitive dissonance. Similar to the 
research on cognitive dissonance, we find that feelings of 
discomfort arose after experiencing two conflicting 
emotions. However, in contrast to cognitive dissonance, the 
subsequent steps taken to reduce emotional dissonance may 
differ. For example, cognitive dissonance can be resolved by 
altering a cognition or behavior. In the classic case of a 
cigarette smoker, the smoker could quit, deny or diminish 
health risks by rationalizing that the benefits of smoking (e.g., 
relaxation) outweighed its risks. Importantly, each of these 
resolutions includes cognitive or conative changes related to 
the provoked inconsistency.  
However, the degree to which the typical cognitive 
dissonance resolution processes (e.g., re-appraisal) can occur 
for dissonance between emotional elements is unclear, and in 
fact some research suggests the parallels may be limited. For 
example, the opportunity or ability to consciously shift one 
set of beliefs or behaviors may be more limited in the 
domain of emotions relative to cognitions because emotional 
experience may occur below conscious awareness (Zajonc 
1980). Further, the ability to change an emotionally-based 
attitude or experience with a cognitively-based belief or 
argument is often difficult (Edwards 1990). Therefore, the 
outlets for the reduction of emotional dissonance may be 
fewer in number or different in type than those for cognitive 
dissonance, thereby leading to the possibility that emotionally 
dissonant states may not be as well-accepted as cognitively 
dissonant states by Americans. Indeed, McQuarrie and Mick 
(1992) found that American subjects had little problem with 
ads that appeared to communicate conflicting rhetorical 
meanings (positive and negative) about a brand. Such indirect 
evidence supports the premise that Americans may deal with, 
and indeed even like, conflicting cognitive meanings if they 
are part of a playful rhetorical ad (e.g. Scott 1994), but 
perhaps cannot or do not respond positively when the 
conflict focuses on emotional reactions. Future research is 
needed to examine these possibilities, and in doing so explore 
the differences and similarities in the consequences of 
emotional versus cognitive dissonant states.
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EXPERIMENT 2 DEPENDENT MEASURES  
AS A FUNCTION OF EMOTIONAL APPEAL TYPE AND CULTURE  
                 










































































1.73 3.80 3.01 2.15 3.53 3.39 
 
NOTE. -- Higher means indicate more intense feelings and more positive attitudes. Cell sizes range from 16 to 26. 
  








EXPERIMENT 3 DEPENDENT MEASURES 

























































NOTE. -- Higher means indicate more intense feelings and more positive attitudes. Cell sizes range from 15 to 27. 
 
 
 
